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The Ritual Stance and the Precaution System: The role of goal-demotion and 
opacity in ritual and everyday actions  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Rituals tend to be both causally opaque and goal-demoted, yet these two qualities are 
rarely dissociated in the literature. Here we manipulate both factors and demonstrate their 
unique influence on ritual cognition. In a 2 x 3 (Action-Type x Goal-Information) 
between subjects design 484 US adults viewed Causally Opaque (Ritual) or Causally 
Transparent (Ordinary) actions performed on identical objects. They were provided with 
no goal information, positive goal information (‘Blessing’) or negative goal information 
(‘Cursing’). Neither causal opacity nor goal information influenced perceptions of 
physical change/causation. In contrast, causal opacity increased attributions of 
‘specialness’, whereas goal-information did not. Finally, goal-information interacted with 
action-type on measures of preference, such that ordinary actions are influenced by both 
‘blessings’ and ‘curses’, but ritual actions are only influenced by ‘curses’.  These findings 
are interpreted in light of the Ritual Stance, and the cognitive bases of the effects are 
described with reference to Boyer and Liénard’s Precaution theory of ritualized behavior. 
The combined value of these two theories is discussed, and extended to a causal model of 
developmental ritual ‘calibration’.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Ritual Cognition, Ritual, Goal Demotion, Causal Opacity, Religion, Action 
Perception, Action Precaution System 
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1.1 Introduction 
Ritual-like behavior appears to have been a part of the Homo behavioral repertoire 
for hundreds of thousands of years, with evidence of Neandertal burial dating back 
~300kya  (Rendu et al., 2014). The ubiquity of such actions in modern Homo sapiens, 
and their general absence in our closest living relatives, suggests an adaptive role. Rituals 
solve evolutionary and cultural problems, including bonding and cooperation 
(Konvalinka et al., 2011; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer, 2014; 
Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009), commitment to group values (Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 
2009; Irons, 2001; Ruffle & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Ruffle, 2003), and transmission of 
normative and cultural information (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; 
Rossano, 2012; Schjoedt et al., 2013; Sosis & Bressler, 2003).  While the effects of ritual 
are well documented, less is understood regarding the cognitive mechanisms that bring 
these effects about. Ritualized actions can be recognized for their repetition, redundancy, 
stereotypy, and formality (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Eilam, Zor, 
Szechtman, & Hermesh, 2006; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rappaport, 1999; Rossano, 2012). 
Such actions also feature causal opacity and goal-demotion: qualities which can apply to 
the whole sequence of actions (‘ritual’; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 
2013). While many ordinary behaviors embody these qualities (as with the repetition of 
cleaning, or the formalities of social life) rituals feature these qualities in conjunction and 
often without instrumental justification. In the absence of a rich exegetical history 
associated with particular actions (as is often the case with religious rituals) both causal 
opacity and goal-demotion, which are common qualities of many rituals, allow observers 
to identify an action sequence as a ritual rather than as an ordinary alternative (Nielbo & 
Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013), thus cuing different behavioral and cognitive 
responses. 
However, not all rituals are created equal. Rituals may not be causally opaque, nor 
goal demoted (nor do they always occur simultaneously). Religious rituals, for example, 
typically have a great deal of history and exegetical justification (which means they are 
not goal-demoted), and may involve instrumental outcomes, such as making something 
clean (which means they are causally transparent). Hereafter, we refer to the phenomenon 
under consideration as ritualized behavior (as defined in the first paragraph) and refer to 
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sequences of ritualized behaviors, not as ‘rituals’, but as ritualized actions. This 
terminology has been used in order to avoid confusion or conflation with other kinds of 
ritual, particularly religious rituals.  
Causally opaque actions (like crossing one’s fingers for good luck) deny 
observers intuitive access to the mechanism by which the action causes an effect. 
According to a number of authors such actions obfuscate instrumental interpretations due 
to a “decoupling of an action sequence’s causal dependency structure” (Kapitány & 
Nielsen, 2015; Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Legare & Wen, 2014; Legare, 
Whitehouse, Wen, & Herrmann, 2012; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; Nielsen, 
Kapitány, & Elkins, 2015; Schjoedt et al., 2013; Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & 
Clegg, 2014). Conversely, causally transparent (ordinary) actions can be easily and 
intuitively understood (as is the case with hammering a nail into wood). While causal 
opacity describes whether or not an action sequence has an observable potential 
mechanism, goal-demotion refers to an observer’s ability to infer and understand an 
actor’s reason (e.g., goals or motivations) for a given action sequence (Boyer & Liénard, 
2006; Keren, Fux, Eilam, Mort, & Lawson, 2013; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Nielbo & 
Sorensen, 2011; Schjoedt et al., 2013). Put simply, causal opacity begets the question ‘by 
what mechanism is an effect being caused’ while goal-demotion begets ‘Why does the 
actor act?’. Rituals tend to be both opaque and goal-demoted, and as a result, are rarely 
dissociated in the literature. 
When we perceive an action as opaque and goal-demoted we recognize it as 
deliberate (not incidental or accidental) and adopt the ritual stance; via conventional and 
affiliative motives we make normative and social inferences which inform our 
subsequent behavior (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013; Legare & Souza, 
2012; Nielsen et al., 2015). This has been demonstrated in children (DiYanni, Corriveau, 
Kurkul, Nasrini, & Nini, 2015; Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & 
Whitehouse, 2015; Nielsen et al., 2015) and adults (Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; 
Irons, 2001; Ruffle & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Ruffle, 2003). Furthermore, artificial neural 
networks have been shown to learn how to discriminate between ritualized and non-
ritualized action sequences (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013). But 
what are the proximate and ultimate explanations for discriminating between ritualised 
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actions and non-ritualized actions? What cognitive mechanisms or systems are 
responsible? 
According to Boyer & Liénard (2006) and Liénard & Boyer (2006) ritualized 
behavior constitutes the elements of ritual. They argue that ritualized actions are ‘partly 
parasitic’ on cognitive systems adapted to serve other purposes and that cultural rituals 
are a by-product. These systems, identified respectively as the Hazard-Precaution and the 
Action Parsing system, are design to detect inferred threat and potential harm to protect 
the organism, but misfire in the case of ritualized action1. The ‘proper functional range’ 
of activation is a range of stimuli calibrated by evolution adaptive to the organism, while 
the ‘actual domain’ includes an extended range of stimuli, not shaped by evolution, 
which share a sufficient number of features with ‘proper’ stimuli. For example, children 
may adaptively avoid dangerous foods by virtue of taste cues - like bitterness - but may 
incorrectly reject palatable food - like broccoli - as a result (Wardle & Cooke, 2008). The 
Hazard-Precaution and Action Parsing systems are calibrated to respond to inferred threat 
via cues in the behavior of others who are directly responding to legitimate threats. For 
example, the proper range of activation for hazard-precaution may include responding to 
others’ behavior as they respond to pathogen or social threat. To illustrate: observing a 
response to pathogen threat may include observing deliberate repetitive cleaning and 
caution (in the form of stereotypy); observing a response to social threat may include 
imitation/synchrony, submission/supplication, or conformity (Watson-Jones, Whitehouse, 
& Legare, in press). 
Ritualized actions share many features and cues with ‘proper’ threat response, and 
tend to disrupt the level at which the actions are analysed and interpreted, arresting the 
system, a phenomenon known as ‘cognitive capture’ (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & 
Boyer, 2006; Nielbo, Schjoedt, & Sorensen, 2013; Zacks, 2004a, 2004b; Zacks, Speer, 
Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007). There are three hierarchical levels of action 
parsing: ‘Scripts’ ‘Behavior’, and ‘Gesture’. The default level is Behavior. For example, 
																																																								
1 A great deal has been written on Action Parsing independent of these authors. See Nielbo, 
Schjoedt, & Sorensen, 2013; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013; Zacks, 2004a, 2004b; 
Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007.  
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you might observe someone in a kitchen and describe their behavior as {cleaning a 
glass}, because you can intuit the actor’s intentions and the mechanisms of action. This 
contrasts with Gesture. Here, the same actions are parsed discretely as [raising a glass], 
[grasping a cloth] and [rubbing the glass with a cloth]. Scripts generate a broader 
description, like ‘preparing lunch’ or ‘cleaning the kitchen’. When the action-elements 
involved in {cleaning a glass} are used in such a way as to prevent an instrumental 
outcome we shift down to [gesture]. For example, we cannot say someone is {cleaning} 
if a cloth, despite being moved in a cleaning motion, is never bought into contact with the 
glass. Thus, we automatically parse the actions discretely as [raising a glass] [grasping a 
cloth] and [waving the cloth in the air].  
Our systems are arrested when cognitive predictions are disrupted by error-
checking processes. When actions are goal demoted and causally opaque we are forced to 
parse at a gestural, rather than a behavioral, level (Schjoedt et al., 2013; Watson-Jones et 
al., in press; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001). However, we are motivated to return to the 
default level of interpretation, and so we attempt to attribute and infer meaning 
(Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rossano, 2012; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; 
Schjoedt et al., 2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013). Causal opacity has been discussed in the 
literature in depth (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015; Legare et al., 2012; Nielsen et al., 2015; 
Schjoedt et al., 2013; Watson-Jones et al., 2014). In a recent study Kapitány and Nielsen 
(2015) showed that objects subjected to opaque actions were reported as more special and 
desirable compared to objects subjected to transparent actions. Providing benign social 
context increased this effect, while aversive context had no influence. They concluded 
that ritualized actions are interpreted normatively. Unlike causal opacity, goal-demotion 
has been less explored (but see: Keren et al., 2013; Mitkidis, Lienard, Nielbo, & 
Sorensen, 2014; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013).  
In the current study we directly manipulate and dissociate causal opacity and 
goal-demotion. Participants were shown a series of videos featuring an actor performing 
actions on sets of identical glasses containing an amber liquid. Actions were presented as 
either ritualistic (causally opaque) or ordinary (causally transparent) and were 
accompanied with a description of the actor’s intentions (‘goals’) as either a blessing or a 
curse, or were left without a description. We chose to employ two opposite-valence goals 
	 7
in order to better assess the magnitude of any potential effect (as we anticipate they will 
elicit different responses). All actions were described as belonging to a specific benign 
ritual tradition. After viewing the videos participants responded to questions addressing 
whether each glass was the ‘same’ and/or ‘special’, and which they’d most like to drink 
from.  
Our predictions derive from the ritual stance (that ritualistic actions are 
interpreted normatively). We hypothesised that objects subjected to ritualized actions 
(opaque actions) would be rated as more special and desirable (i.e., they would be chosen 
as the glass to drink from) than objects subjected to ordinary (transparent) actions. 
Additionally, compared to no goal information, blessings (positive goal information) 
would increase desirability, and curses (negative goal information) would decrease it. We 
made no predictions regarding the ‘same’ question, as this question primarily serves as an 
attention-check (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015, found judgements of ‘sameness’ to be 
unaffected by the types of actions presented).  
 
2.1 Methods 
 2.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited via mTurk and were offered $1.20(US) for their time. 
Based on the methods and analyses of Kapitany and Nielsen (2015), and an informal p-
curve analyses conducted on those findings (unpublished), we made an a priori decision 
to attempt to collect 100 participants per cell. Data was collected in a single wave, and no 
ad hoc decisions were made to alter the desired N. A total of 694 people accepted the 
initial HIT, but 170 immediately dropped out. A further 22 completed less than 51% of 
the key questions and were omitted from the final dataset. Finally, we deleted 19 
participants from condition 5 (Ordinary / Blessing), as experimenter error compromised 
their data (they were accidentally given a question from condition 3 – Ritual / Blessing). 
The final sample comprised 484 participants (Mean age = 34.34 years, SD = 11.18). Of 
these, 41.5% completed a tertiary degree, 10.4% held a Post-graduate degree, 29.0% 
reported some tertiary education, and 18% had only completed high school, 1% reporting 
‘some high school’ and 1 participant did not provide a response. The majority of 
participants (48.3%) earned less than $25,000(US) annually, 13.3% earned between 
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$25,001 and $35,000, and 18.5% earned more than $45,001 annually. Participants 
comprised 57.6% males and 42.2% female (with one value missing; note that we also 
provided a third option, ‘other’, for gender. It was not used). Possible gender effects were 
examined in analyses (upon peer-review) but did not indicate any cause for concern, as a 
result, all analyses disregard gender information.  
 
2.3 Procedure 
 Participants were briefed and randomly assigned to one of six conditions that 
varied by Action-Type (either Ritual or Ordinary actions) or Goal-type (Blessing, Curse, 
or Goal-Absent). They first completed a basic demographic survey, then, over three 
blocks of stimuli, watched six videos (two per block) in which a male adult acted on 
glasses containing an amber liquid. After viewing each video participants responded to 
the same questions: ‘Are the drinks the same?’, ‘Is either/any drink special? If so, which 
one?’, and ‘Which drink would you select to drink?’. After viewing all videos, 
participants explained how they understood the terms ‘special’ and ‘same’. Finally, 
participants completed a ‘Religiosity Scale’ (8-items; Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975), and a 
novel scale assessing their ‘History of religious and ritual exposure’ (16-items; Kapitány 
& Nielsen, 2015). 
 
2.4 Materials 
 Following Kapitány and Nielsen (2015), half of the videos used in this experiment 
featured novel ritualized action sequences (causally opaque, goal-demoted actions). The 
other half were matched sequences of ordinary actions (causally transparent, goal-
apparent actions). There were three examples of each type of video in each category. All 
videos involved pouring a liquid from a small glass into a large glass, where superficial 
features of the procedure were varied according to condition2. All videos are available 
upon request.   
Both ritual and ordinary videos followed identical formats (see Figure 1). In 
which an experimenter presented a number of large glasses, performed a condition-
																																																								
2 Examples of videos are available at www.rohankapitany.com  
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specific action on them, and poured an amber liquid from a smaller glass into the larger 
glass. The ritual condition included additional redundancy and concluded with the 
experimenter bowing to the glass (it was simply inspected in the ordinary condition). As 
per Kapitány and Nielsen (2015), videos belonged to one of three discrete blocks of 
stimuli. Block 1 involved one action performed on one of two glasses, Block 2 involved 
one action on one of three glasses, and Block 3 involved two actions on two of three 
glasses. In Block 3 one glass is singled out through inaction, while in Block 1 and 2, one 
glass was singled out by virtue of actions performed. Block 3 was included to ensure that 
participants’ responses were attributable to qualities of the action, rather than the fact that 
one glass was singled out. The locations of the acted-upon object(s) in each block were 
fully counter-balanced (positions: Left, Right, or Centre). All videos were accompanied 
with the following statement: ‘This video contains elements of established ritual seen 
around the world. The actions in this video can be seen in [ceremony name] of 
[Location]’. The ceremonies used were: ‘Bwiti Ceremony (Gabon, Africa)’,  ‘Kava 
Ceremony (Fiji, Pacific Islands), and ‘Ayahuasca Ceremony (Ecuador, South America)’. 
Depending on goal condition, participants were either told that 1) These actions are a 
blessing. They are performed to give someone good luck and excellent health, 2) These 
actions a curse. They are performed to give someone bad luck and poor health, or 3) 
were provided no goal information.  
 
[Figure 1 and Figure 1 caption here] 
 
2.5 Coding and Analysis 
After each video the same questions were asked. When asked the forced-choice 
questions ‘are the drinks the same’ and ‘is either/any drink special?’, an affirmative 
response was coded as 1, with a negative response coded 0. Thus, a participant could 
score a maximum of 2 per block, where 2 affirms the quality on both trials, 1 indicates 
alternating responses, and a score of 0 represents no support for the quality.  When asked 
to choose which drink they would select to drink, a score of 1 was awarded only if they 
selected a drink which had been acted-upon. Thus, 2 represents exclusive preference for 
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the acted-upon object(s), 1 indicates alternating responses, and 0 indicates they 
consistently avoided the acted-upon drinks.  
Such ordered categorical data is best treated with an Ordinal Logistic Regression 
(OLR), but where the assumption of proportional odds was violated a Multinomial 
Logistic Regression (MLR) was used. Unless otherwise stated, all OLR analyses satisfied 
this assumption.  For more information on OLR and MLR please see Menard (2010), 
Field (2013) and Kleinbaum & Klein (2010). 
 
2.6 Are the drinks the same? 
 Using an OLR, neither Block 1 (χ2(3) = 2.753, p = .431) nor Block 2 (χ2(3)= 
1.305, p = .728) had a better fit than the general model. A non-significant value indicates 
that a model with predictors is not better than a general model without predictors. The 
data in Block 3 returned a significant Test of Parallel lines (p < .001)3, but the final model 
fit was not significant, χ2(3) = 1.279, p = .734. Based on these null results we have no 
evidence to conclude that action-type or goal information influenced participants’ 
perceptions of sameness amongst objects. Figure 2 shows the mean percentage of 
responses in each category with goal information collapsed into action-type. 
 
[Figure 2 and Figure 2 caption here] 
 
2.7 Is either drink special? 
In Block 1 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(3)= 18.953, p < .001, 
indicating that a model with predictors was better than a model without predictors. 
Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(7)= 3.234, p = .863, did not fall below the threshold for 
rejection (p < .05). As Table 1 shows, when actions are opaque, participants are 2.07 
																																																								
3 This suggests that the assumption of proportional odds was violated. When an MLR was run 
(and the reference category was set ‘Drinks Always the Same’) the only significant result (p = 
.037) was that Opacity made participants about half as likely (OR = .542) to have alternating 
responses across presentations (but made no difference to reporting that objects different across 
both presentation). However, this analysis violated Pearson’s Goodness of Fit statistic, χ2(6)= 
17.190, p = .009. Inclusion of an interaction term (as discussed in ‘Exploratory Analysis’) 
returned no significant results. Thus, for the sake of consistency, and because no analysis appears 
superior to any other, the results of the OLR are reported here.  
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times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the 
DV. No effect of Goal was observed. Pseudo-R2 values range from .021 (McFadden) to 
.045 (Nagelkerke). 
In Block 2 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(3)= 23.811, p < .001. 
Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(7)= 9.235, p = .236, did not fall below the threshold for 
rejection (p < .05). As Table 1 shows, when actions are opaque, participants are 2.28 
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the 
DV. No effect of Goal was observed. Pseudo-R2 values range from .026 (McFadden) to 
.057 (Nagelkerke). 
In Block 3 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(3)= 28.919, p < .001. 
Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(7)= 9.027, p = .251, did not fall below the threshold for 
rejection (p < .05). As Table 1 shows, when actions are opaque, participants are 2.58 
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the 
DV. No effect of Goal was observed.  Pseudo-R2 values range from .030 (McFadden) to 
.067 (Nagelkerke). Figure 3 shows the mean proportion of responses in each category 
with goal-information collapsed into action-type. 
Thus, across all three blocks, when the modelled actions were opaque participants 
were more than twice as likely to report the presence of a special object within the set 
compared to causally transparent actions. 
 
[Table 1 and Table 1 caption here] 
 
[Figure 3 and Figure 3 caption here] 
 
2.8 Which drink would you select to drink? 
Blocks 1 and 3 on the ‘Drink’ variable returned a significant result on the Test of 
Parallel Lines (p < .05), indicating that the logit (the odds ratio) varies between levels of 
the DV for a given IV. Block 2 had a Pearson’s Goodness of fit violation. Thus, we used 
an MLR analysis. 
In Block 1 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(6)= 156.715, p < 
.001. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 5.087, p = .279, did not fall below the threshold 
	 12
for rejection (p < .05). As Table 2 shows, at level 1 of the DV, opacity does not 
significantly predict outcomes. However, at level 2 of the DV, opacity makes participants 
2.96 times more likely the select the acted upon drink exclusively (i.e., to select it twice 
over two trials). Compared to no goal, a curse makes participants .44 times as likely to 
select the acted upon object once (at Level 1), and .08 times as likely to select the acted 
upon object exclusively (at Level 2). A blessing makes participants 1.95 times more 
likely to select the acted upon object once (at Level 1), and 1.98 times as likely to select 
the acted upon object exclusively (at Level 2). Pseudo-R2 values range from .152 
(McFadden) to .314 (Nagelkerke).  
In Block 2 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(6)= 114.913, p < 
.001. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 9.094, p = .059, did not fall below the threshold 
for rejection (p < .05). As Table 2 shows, opacity does not significantly predict outcomes 
at Level 1. However, it does make participants 2.78 times more likely to select the acted 
upon object exclusively at Level 2. Compared to no goal, a curse makes participants .50 
times as likely to select the acted upon object once (at Level 1), and .18 times as likely to 
select the acted upon object exclusively (at Level 2). A blessing makes participants 2.39 
times as likely to select the acted upon object once (at Level 1), and 2.25 times as likely 
to select the acted upon object exclusively (at Level 2). Pseudo-R2 values range from .112 
(McFadden) to .240 (Nagelkerke).  
In Block 3 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(6)= 49.685, p < .001. 
Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 14.129, p = .007, did fall below the threshold (p < .05), 
which suggests there are non-linearities in the data, and the model fit could be improved 
by their inclusion (Field, 2013), a point discussed in the next section ‘Exploratory 
Analysis’. As Table 2 shows, opacity does not significantly predict outcomes at Level 1. 
However, it does make participants 1.78 times more likely to select the acted upon drink 
exclusively at Level 2. 
Compared to no goal, a curse makes participants .49 times as likely to select the 
acted upon object once (Level 1), and .24 times as likely to select the acted upon object 
exclusively (Level 2). A blessing does not significantly predict responses at Level 1 or 
Level 2. Pseudo-R2 values range from .048 (McFadden) to .110 (Nagelkerke). 
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In sum, across blocks, opacity increased likelihood of selecting an acted-upon 
object exclusively. Curses reliably decrease the likelihood of selection across both levels 
of the DV, and blessings generally increased the likelihood of selection. 
 
[Table 2 and Table 2 caption here] 
 
2.9 Exploratory Analysis 
 An informed, post-hoc, decision was made to evaluate whether or not there was a 
significant interaction between Action-Type and Goal, as suggested by the Pearson’s 
goodness-of-fit statistic on the desirability measure. All analyses were re-run including an 
interaction term. Using an OLR, the pattern of results remained identical for ‘same’ and 
‘special’ and no interaction was observed (as one would expect, given the pattern of 
results in the a priori analyses). Using an MLR, a significant interaction between Action-
Type and Goal was observed in drink preferences (as implied by the Pearson goodness-
of-fit statistic), and the pattern of results remained largely intact (i.e., opacity had a 
significant and positive impact at level 2 across all three blocks). However, the influence 
of Goal Information varied. Due to the difficulty in describing interactions of nominal 
categorical IVs on ordinal categorical DVs with respect to a reference category we ran 
two separate analyses. First, we manually split our data by Action-Type, then ran an OLR 
to determine the influence of Goal on drink preference for those who observed ordinary 
actions, and a separate OLR on drink preference for those who observed ritualized 
actions.  The results of these analyses (including tests of assumptions) can be seen in 
Table 3. For ordinary actions, in Block 1 and 2 we found that Goal information 
influenced drink preference in the expected directions at similar magnitudes as before. In 
Block 3, no effect of goal information was observed, indeed, the model fit was not 
significant. For opaque actions, curses made participants significantly less likely to select 
acted-upon objects at each level across all three blocks. Interestingly, blessings had no 
effect on participants’ responses in any block. While both positive and negative goal 
information appears to influence participant perceptions for transparent actions, only 
negative goal information influences perceptions of opaque actions.  
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 All analysis (see table 3) satisfied the assumption of proportional odds, and model 
fitness (except for the effect of goal information on transparent actions in Block 3, (χ2(2) 
=2.404, p =.301).  
 
[Table 3 and Table 3 caption here] 
 
[Figure 4 and Figure 4 caption here] 
 
3.1 Understanding participant responses on ‘specialness’ and ‘sameness’.  
After the videos, but prior to the survey items, participants were asked “After you 
watched the videos we asked you whether you thought objects were 'special' [‘the 
same’]...” and were respectively presented with each of the following sentences: “If you 
indicated that objects were special, in what way did you mean? How were you using the 
label 'special'?” and “In what way did you understand the objects as being 'same' (or 
different)?”. Table 4 shows the coded qualitative responses with regard to their 
understanding of ‘Same’ and Table 5 shows the coded qualitative responses for ‘Special’.  
The lead author developed a coding system based on the existing responses, and 
informed by previous work by Kapitány & Nielsen (2015) Menard (2010) and predictions 
of the Action-Parsing system (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Zacks, 
2004a). These responses were then coded in their entirety by two blind coders. Special 
Responses had a mean percentage agreement 84.9% and a Krippendorff’s Alpha of .767 
(indicating ‘Substantial’ agreement; for context: values greater than .81 are regarded as 
‘Almost Perfect Agreement’. See Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). Same responses had a 
mean percentage agreement of 89.64% and a Krippendorff’s Alph of .800.  
When asked to define the term ‘same’, across all conditions, between 65.5% and 
76.6% of all responses made reference to ‘physical or visually accessible qualities of the 
object’ (See Table 4 for full breakdown). When asked to define the term ‘special’ across 
all conditions, between 36.9% and 62.8% of all responses (forming the primary response 
category) made reference to the actor’s actions or focus. We anticipated that this would 
happen proportionally more in ritual conditions, by virtue of the action’s casual opacity. 
When analyzed with an MLR, we found a significantly better fit, χ2(18) = 42.452, p = 
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.001. When the reference category was set to ‘Denial of Specialness’ we found Opaque 
Actions made participants 2.136 times more likely to define special with reference to ‘the 
actions or focus of the actor’ (Wald Value(1) = 7.898, p = .005,  β = 0.759, 95%CI = 
1.258– 3.626). Opaque Actions also made participants 3.340 times more likely to 
reference a non-physical quality of the object (Wald Value(1) = 8.953, p = .003,  β = 
1.206, 95%CI = 1.516 – 7.359). Opaque actions also made participants 4.062 times more 
likely to refer to location of an object, (Wald Value(1) = 6.708, p = .010,  β = 1.402, 
95%CI = 1.406 – 11.734). There was no effect of goal information. Pseudo-R2 values for 
‘Special’ ranged from .035 (McFadden) to .098 (Nagelkerke). 
 
[Table 4 and Table 4 caption here] 
 
[Table 5 and Table 5 caption here] 
 
4.1 Participant Demographics 
 Participants completed a ‘Religiosity Scale’ (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975), and a 
scale assessing their ‘History of religious and ritual exposure’ (Kapitány & Nielsen, 
2015). Religiosity was measured on 3-subscales and aggregated into a single 5-point 
measure (M = 2.24; SD = 1.29; α = .95) while history of religious and ritual exposure 
comprised 3 sub-scales (5-items on Superstitious Rituals, 8-items on Cultural Rituals, and 
3-items on Religious Rituals). These scales were converted to a 6-points for aggregation 
(M = 2.92; SD = .71; α = .81). Religiosity and Ritual exposure were moderately 
correlated at r = .562, p < .01. No systematic pattern correlation between these scales and 
the dependent variables was observed. 
 
5.1 Discussion 
In this work we aimed to dissociate the roles of goal-demotion and causal opacity 
in adults’ processing of ritualized actions. First, neither action-type nor goal-information 
influenced participants’ perceptions of whether or not the objects were the ‘same’, with 
the vast majority interpreting sameness in terms of physical qualities of the object. 
Opaque actions reliably caused attributions of specialness, while goal-information had no 
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effect. Indeed, the majority of participants organically defined specialness with reference 
to the actions or focus of the actor. Further, opaque actions made participants much more 
likely to exclusively prefer acted-upon objects. Such actions did not influence preference 
on only one trial, suggesting (for some people) ritualized actions provide a categorical 
imperative to select ritualized objects always. Critically, curses made objects less 
desirable: any action labelled a curse considerably increased avoidance. This is consistent 
with other work, in which people tend to be cautious of things that are ‘magically 
dangerous’ (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002) or essentially corrupted (Nemeroff & Rozin, 
1994; Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Savani, Kumar, 
Naidu, & Dweck, 2011). However, calling an action a blessing increased preference for 
acted-upon objects in Block 1 and 2, but not in Block 3. Follow-up analysis revealed an 
interaction (explaining this anomaly). We found that goal-information systematically 
varied preference across action-type. Objects subjected to ordinary actions became less 
desirable when called a curse, but more desirable if called a blessing. Objects subjected to 
ritualistic actions became less desirable when called a curse, but were not influenced 
when called a blessing. As far as ritualized actions are interpreted positively by default 
(Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015) adding additional positive goal information appears to have 
little effect. Actions, so the saying goes, speak louder than words4. This suggests an 
interesting dissociation between causal opacity and goal-demotion. Opacity informs our 
understanding of an object’s status, while Goal-Information and opacity inform our 
approach/avoid behavior toward such objects.  Moreover, while negative Goal-
Information causes aversion, positive Goal-Information does not always cause approach 
behavior above-and-beyond variance attributable to opacity.  
Other researchers have produced equally interesting work on this dissociation, 
modelling potential differences in action parsing attributable to these qualities (Nielbo & 
																																																								
4 It should be noted that the measure of effect size presented here, the Pseudo-R2 value, 
‘should be treated with caution’ (Field, 2013). While it can be regarded as somewhat analogous to 
R2 in linear regression, many have argued the measure has issues. Thus, while the effect of 
specialness is small, it is reliably elicited by the described methods, as it is consistent with 
experiments 1 and 2 of Kapitany and Nielsen (2015). A p-curve analysis conducted prior to this 
experiment suggested the effect has evidentiary value. A p-curve analysis of these prior 
experiments and the present experiment affirms this result. This data can be extracted from the 
stated publications, or is available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013). They report that ‘cultural priors’ tend to 
increase the degree to which cultural experts (those experienced and expert in a given 
ritual tradition, for example, a priest) see a ritualized act as ordinary and instrumental 
compared to one who is not a cultural expert. Thus, it is possible that actions are not 
necessarily treated equally in the minds of all individuals. Our ritual condition included a 
number of causally opaque and goal demoted actions, but also included bowing – a 
highly familiar, abstract action that carries pre-existing culture-dependent associations of 
respect and reverence. Any individual familiar, or ‘expert’, in the role a bow serves may 
rely heavily (and perhaps exclusively) on this action at the expense of the novel actions in 
determining an objects’ significance. However, we do not think this is the case here. 
When participants were asked how they defined special, only six participants (of 484) 
made explicit reference to the bow. Of those 6, all made reference to the bow as one of 
multiple actions (e.g., ‘He … did something to the particular glass… i.e. hum at it or bow 
to it’ and ‘I took it to mean if it [‘specialness’] was gestured to via the flapping or sound 
or bowing’), and the two responses which appeared to make the strongest case for 
bowing without referencing other actions explicitly still included other generalities 
associated with the novel actions (i.e., ‘Objects were treated with respect, and bowed 
head as a offering’ and ‘more elaborate ritual, the bowing and offering’). Given that 
participants in the ritual conditions saw six bows (across six videos) and up to three 
different kinds of ritualized actions, and only six made reference to the bow, four of 
whom made explicit reference to other ritualized actions, we do not believe the bow was 
privileged above-and-beyond the other actions.”   
Differences in how the term ‘special’ was understood across conditions revealed 
different levels of action-parsing. Causally opaque actions caused parsing at the lowest 
level (gesture) and generated an appeal to the actor’s inner state. This is consistent with 
empirical work (Nielbo & Sorensen, 2011; Zacks, 2004a; Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 
2001) and theoretical predictions (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006). It is 
nevertheless worth noting that ritual videos were typically slightly longer than the control 
videos, and the ritual videos contained two extra event-boundaries not generated by 
causal opacity: the redundant raising prior to pouring action, and the use of two hands 
(rather than one hand) in the bow/inspection action at the end of the sequence. However, 
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the extent to which these two additional boundaries contributed to the overall effect is 
likely to be relatively minor. Ritual actions, by their causally opaque nature, generate 
more additional boundaries than ordinary actions, and so, the difference in perceived 
event boundaries between the two conditions is already considerably weighted in favor of 
the ritual condition. Further, this falls fully under the umbrella of cognitive capture – 
these two additional boundaries further captured participants, which in turn, likely 
increased the motivation to restore behavioral understanding.  Finally, we are not making 
the claim that a specific number of subunits of action make a ritual special or efficacious 
(though this is an interesting question), we are simply making the argument that a greater 
number of subunits (generated by opacity and goal demotion) motivates participants to 
restore a behavioral explanation for the actions, which begets appeals to the actor’s goals. 
We found evidence in support of this position. However, we are cautious, and maintain 
this is only modest evidence for the role of cognitive capture. 
Ritualized actions activate cognitive systems outside the proper range causing 
participants to process actions at a lower-level, in turn, motivating a search for the 
actions’ meaning to restore default {behavioral} parsing and understanding (Herrmann et 
al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielbo & Sorensen, 2011; Rossano, 2012; Schjoedt et 
al., 2013; Zacks, 2004a; Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2001). Lacking a clear way to 
integrate this experience, we interpret these deliberate causally opaque actions as socially 
normative (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielsen et al., 2015). Boyer 
and Liénard have argued that cultural rituals are a special case of ritualized behavior: 
Mis-activations of the hazard-system are calibrated throughout childhood, and adult 
responses are constrained to a limited repertoire of learned behaviors. We suggest the 
dominant calibrated response is to interpret the actions as normative. Further, we believe 
the phenomenon of overimitation may be the mechanism of calibration. Overimitation 
occurs when children copy obviously causally-irrelevant actions within a larger sequence 
of adult-modeled behavior: When children observe these redundant, repetitive, goal-
demoted, causally-opaque acts they interpret them normatively and conventionally 
(Kenward, 2012). Additionally, they copy with high-fidelity (Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Marcris, & Keil, 2011) and do so reliably across cultures 
(Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). It is possible 
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our observations reflect this calibration – ritualized actions activate the Precaution 
System which has been calibrated throughout development to respond in a normative 
manner  (notably, adults are more likely to overimitate than children; McGuigan et al., 
2011).  We believe over-imitation/calibration explains why providing positive goal 
information (a blessing) doesn’t influence behavior toward goal-demoted acts. 
We propose, as predicted by the Hazard-Precaution system, that over the course 
of development we begin to understand many actions as socially normative, particularly 
casually-opaque and goal-demoted actions (via over-imitation). Further, as predicted by 
the Action-Parsing system, ritualized actions are parsed differently from ordinary actions 
due to the absence of a plausible causal mechanism and the obscurity of the actor’s goals; 
ritualized actions are necessarily interpreted at the level of {gesture} rather than 
[behavior], resulting in ‘cognitive capture’. Such capture occurs when the Precaution-
System activates outside the ‘proper range’ of stimuli, motivating us to restore a 
[behavioral] understanding. Thus, lacking a clear schema for why an action is being 
performed, and due to calibration in childhood, we interpret these actions as socially 
normative, as described by the Ritual Stance. More work needs to be done delineating 
how this process operates, work well outside the scope of the present study. Though it is 
notable that each of the distinct approaches has been previously validated and empirically 
supported.  
While rituals only emerged as a part of our behavioral repertoire in recent 
evolutionary history, their ubiquity suggests they serve an adaptive role. Rituals, as 
intentional motor acts, are unique: they disrupt our capacity to infer a causal mechanism, 
they deny us insight into an actor’s inner-state, and they activate cognitive systems 
adapted to other purposes. Understanding each of these elements is complicated, but here 
we contribute to the growing body of evidence that illustrates the importance each 
element plays. Moreover, we have taken modest steps toward dissociating the influence 
of goal-demotion from causal opacity, and have attempted to unify into a causal chain 
several fields of psychological enquiry. While there are several competing and 
complementary grand theories of ritual cognition (notably Whitehouse’s Modes of 
Religiosity and Henrich’s CREDs), we believe Boyer and Liénard Hazard-Precaution 
theory, in conjunction with Legare’s Ritual Stance, coupled with a understanding of the 
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development of overimitation, provide a more comprehensive frame-work than do the 
alternatives. Indeed, together they make important predictions about the underlying 
developmental, cognitive and evolutionary mechanisms of ritual cognition, and dissociate 
the specific roles individual qualities play in ritual. Moreover, they inform both why we 
participate in rituals, and how we respond when we observe them. Targeted research is 
needed to test this proposal. Such work will reveal the foundations, mechanisms, and 
consequences of ritual actions, and provide insight into a core feature of the human 
behavioral repertoire.  
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Table 1. Results of OLR analysis for Blocks 1, 2, and 3 of the ‘Special’ variable 
Block 1 
Two Glasses  
One Action 
Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  16.147 < .001 0.373 - 1.085 2.073 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 1.329 0.249 -0.174 - 0.671 - 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 1.613 0.204 -0.153 - 0.718 - 
   
Block 2 
Three Glasses  
One Action 
Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  20.373 < .001 0.466 - 1.182 2.280 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 0.245 0.620 -0.315 - 0.528 - 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 2.021 0.155 -0.121 - 0.761 - 
   
Block 3 
Three Glasses  
Two Actions 
Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  28.183 < .001 0.598 - 1.298 2.581 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 0.031 0.860 -0.378 - .454 - 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 0.072 0.789 -0.485 - .368 - 
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Table 2. Full results of MLR analysis for Blocks 1, 2, and 3 of the ‘Drink Preference’ 
variable 
Block 1 
Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio 
Picking Acted Upon 
Objects ONCE 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  0.088 0.767 0.562 - 1.530 - 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 8.046 0.005 0.246 - 0.774 0.436 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 3.85 0.050 1.001 - 3.819 1.954 
Picking Acted Upon 
Objects TWICE 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  19.402 < .001 1.827 - 4.803 2.962 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 59.285 < .001 
0'.041 - 
0.151 0.079 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 5.405 0.020 1.114 - 3.537 1.984 
 
  
Block 2 
Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio 
Picking Acted Upon 
Objects ONCE 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  0.007 0.933 .591 - 1.620 - 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 5.557 0.018 .276 - .888 0.495 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 6.727 0.009 1.237 - 4.614 2.389 
Picking Acted Upon 
Objects TWICE 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  19.192 < .001 1.759 - 4.392 2.779 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 36.766 < .001 .103 - .312 0.179 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 7.869 0.005 2.250 - 1.277 2.250 
   
Block 3 
Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio 
Picking Acted Upon 
Objects ONCE 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  3.520 0.061 0.426 - 1.019 - 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 7.049 0.008 0.297 - 0.833 0.497 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 0.016 0.900 0.600 - 1.788 - 
Picking Acted Upon 
Objects TWICE 
Opacity (1) vs 
Transparency (2)  5.800 0.016 1.113 - 2.843 1.779 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 23.303 < .001 0.131 - 0.424 0.236 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 0.106 0.745 0.534 - 1.566 - 
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Table 3. Statistics for exploratory analysis for Blocks 1, 2, and 3 with data split by action-
type.  
 
Block 1 Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio  
Opaque/ 
Ritual 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 53.592 < .001 -3.204 - -1.851 0.080 
 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 0.02 0.888 -0.576 - 0.665 - 
 
Transparent/ 
Ordinary 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 16.841 < .001 -1.873 - -0.662 0.282 
 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 7.294 0.007 0.236 - 1.482 2.361 
 
   
Block 2 Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio  
Opaque/ 
Ritual 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 42.279 < .001 -2.805 - -1.506 0.116 
 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 0.299 0.585 -0.440 - 0.780 - 
 
Transparent/ 
Ordinary 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 4.788 0.029 -1.235 - -0.068 0.521 
 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 8.57 0.003 -0.308 - 1.556 2.540 
 
   
Block 3 Predictor Wald's χ^2 p 95% CI Odds Ratio  
Opaque/ 
Ritual 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 35.026 < .001 -2.559 - -1.286 0.146 
 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 1.56 0.212 -0.903 - 0.200 - 
 
Transparent/ 
Ordinary 
Curse (1) vs  No Goal 
(3) 0.815 0.367 -0.824 - 0.304 - 
 
Bless (2) vs No Goal 
(3) 0.502 0.478 -0.393 - 0.838 - 
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Table 4. Coded qualitative responses for ‘Same’ 
 
  
Ritual / 
Curse 
Ritual / 
No Goal 
Ritual / 
Blessing 
Control /  
Curse 
Control /  
No Goal 
Control / 
Blessing 
 Coded Response n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
 Denial of Sameness 1 (.013) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Reference to 
Actions/Processes  
or Attention/Focus of the 
Actor 13 (.171) 19 (.221) 16 (.178) 22 (.253) 13 (.155) 9 (.150) 
 
Reference to physical or 
visually  
accessible qualities of the 
object 56 (.737) 58 (.674) 61 (.678) 57 (.655) 63 (.750) 46 (.767) 
 
Reference to non-physical 
qualities of object 3 (.039) 6 (.070) 3 (.033) 3 (.034) 5 (.060) 2 (.033) 
 Unintelligible response 3 (.039) 2 (.023) 10 (.111) 3 (.034) 2 (.024) 1 (.017) 
 Missing 0 1 (.012) 0 2 (.023) 1 (.012) 2 (.033) 
 Total N (Total %) 76 (1) 86 (1) 90 (1) 87 (1) 84 (1) 60 (1) 
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Table 5. Coded qualitative responses for ‘Special’  
 
  
Ritual / 
 Curse 
Ritual /  
No Purpose 
Ritual /  
Blessing 
Control /  
Curse 
Control /  
No Purpose 
Control / 
Blessing 
 Coded Response n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
0 Denial of Specialness 10 (.132) 9 (.105) 10 (.111) 20 (.230) 19 (.226) 9 (.150) 
1 
Reference to Actions/Processes 
or Attention/Focus of the Actor 37 (.487) 54 (.628) 48 (.533) 37 (.425) 31 (.369) 36 (.600) 
2 
Reference to physical or visually  
accessible qualities of the object 6 (.079) 3 (.035) 2 (.022) 8 (.092) 12 (.143) 5 (.083) 
3 
Reference to non-physical qualities of 
object 9 (.118) 9 (.105) 12 (.133) 4 (.046) 8 (.095) 2 (.033) 
4 Unintelligible response 1 (.013) 1 (.012) 3 (.033) 5 (.057) 6 (.071) 0 
5 
Referred to the acted-upon and/or  
non-acted-upon object 7 (.092) 2 (.023) 6 (.067) 3 (.033) 1 (.012) 2 (.033) 
6 
Reference to semantic information  
or re-iteration of statement 2 (.026) 0 1 (.011) 1 (.011) 0 0 
 Missing 4 (.053) 9 (.105) 8 (.089( 8 (.092) 7 (.083) 6 (.100) 
 Total N (Total %) 76 (1) 86 (1) 90 (1) 87 (1) 84 (1) 60 (1) 
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Figure Captions. 
 
Figure 1. Images show the ‘Cloth’ ritual acted upon the center glass. Steps 1 and 2 are 
identical for both the ritual and control conditions: the demonstrator moves the large 
glasses in front of the small glasses. In Step 3 the cloth is waved vigorously at the glass 
(ritual), while in the control condition the cloth is used to clean the glass. In step 4 the 
small glass is raised before being poured into the large glass, while in the control 
condition the small glass is poured directly. In step 5 the glass is raised with both hands 
and bowed to (ritual), while in the control condition it is raised with one hand and 
inspected. Finally, the demonstrator returns to a neutral position. (From Kapitány & 
Nielsen, 2015).  
 
Fig. 2. Mean percentage values on ‘Same’ variables across all three blocks with Goal 
Information collapsed into action-type 
 
Fig. 3. Mean percentage values on ‘Special’ responses in each category with goal-
information collapsed into action-type 
 
Fig. 4. Percentage responses for each category split by action-type.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
